Broad DELETE for Authenticated Role

What “Broad DELETE for Authenticated Role” means (plain English)

Giving DELETE permissions to authenticated without ownership checks is too permissive. Broad DELETE for Authenticated Role is a practical security issue for teams using Supabase because exposed tables, storage, or RPC endpoints can return or mutate data beyond intended account boundaries.

How Broad DELETE for Authenticated Role works in Supabase/Postgres (technical)

When policies or RLS do not tie DELETE to identity, authenticated users can delete any row they can reference. Broad DELETE for Authenticated Role usually appears when GRANT scope, RLS policy predicates, SECURITY DEFINER behavior, or request-context claims are misaligned. The durable control is to enforce authorization in SQL with explicit role checks, stable ownership predicates, and migration-tested policy coverage.

Attack paths & failure modes for Broad DELETE for Authenticated Role

• Broad DELETE for Authenticated Role: direct API bypass: The frontend granted DELETE permissions to authenticated so users could remove their own posts.
• Broad DELETE for Authenticated Role: migration drift regression: A new feature adds a table and grants DELETE to authenticated without restriction.
• Broad DELETE for Authenticated Role: direct API bypass: No ownership checks meant attackers could issue direct REST calls and delete arbitrary rows.
• Broad DELETE for Authenticated Role: migration drift regression: The grant let any logged-in user delete rows across tenants.
• The configuration doesn’t match what the UI implies (direct API access bypasses the app).
• Policies/grants drift over time and widen access without anyone noticing.
• Fixes are applied without verification, leading to false confidence.

Why Broad DELETE for Authenticated Role matters for Supabase security

Data loss, privilege escalation, or sabotage become easy once deletions are exposed. If Broad DELETE for Authenticated Role remains unresolved, attackers can automate enumeration and unauthorized writes at API speed. Treat it as a production reliability risk as well as a data security risk, because incidents spread quickly once clients discover weak access boundaries.

Common Broad DELETE for Authenticated Role mistakes that lead to leaks

• Granting DELETE to authenticated for convenience.
• Not enforcing identity on delete paths.
• Relying on UI checks to prevent unauthorized deletions.
• Broad DELETE for Authenticated Role: direct API bypass: No ownership checks meant attackers could issue direct REST calls and delete arbitrary rows.
• Broad DELETE for Authenticated Role: migration drift regression: The grant let any logged-in user delete rows across tenants.

Where to look for Broad DELETE for Authenticated Role in Supabase

• Your grants, policies, and any direct client access paths.
• Storage and RPC settings (common blind spots).

How to detect Broad DELETE for Authenticated Role issues (signals + checks)

Use this as a quick checklist to validate your current state:

• Try the same queries your frontend can run (anon/authenticated). If sensitive rows come back, you have exposure.
• Verify RLS is enabled and (for sensitive tables) forced.
• List policies and look for conditions that don’t bind rows to a user or tenant.
• Audit grants to anon / authenticated on sensitive tables and functions.
• Broad DELETE for Authenticated Role: direct API bypass: DELETE is a sensitive operation.
• Broad DELETE for Authenticated Role: direct API bypass: Backend endpoints should mediate deletions.
• Broad DELETE for Authenticated Role: direct API bypass: Log and audit all delete requests.
• Re-test after every migration that touches security-critical tables or functions.

How to fix Broad DELETE for Authenticated Role (backend-only + zero-policy posture)

Mockly’s safest default is backend-only access: the browser should not query tables, call RPC, or access Storage directly.

1. Decide which operations must remain client-side (often: none for sensitive resources).
2. Create server endpoints (API routes or server actions) for required reads/writes.
3. Apply hardening SQL: enable+force RLS where relevant, remove broad policies, and revoke grants from client roles.
4. Generate signed URLs for private Storage downloads on the server only.
5. Re-run a scan and confirm the issue disappears.
6. Add a regression check to your release process so drift doesn’t reintroduce exposure. Fixes that worked in linked incidents:

• Broad DELETE for Authenticated Role: direct API bypass: Revoke the grant, route deletes through a backend endpoint with validation, and enforce RLS or policies.
• Broad DELETE for Authenticated Role: migration drift regression: Add restrictive policies, backend-only delete flows, and include grant validation in migration reviews.

Verification checklist for Broad DELETE for Authenticated Role

1. Attempt direct access using client credentials and confirm it fails.
2. Apply a backend-only fix pattern and verify end-to-end behavior.
3. Re-run a scan after changes and after the next migration.
4. Broad DELETE for Authenticated Role: direct API bypass: DELETE is a sensitive operation.
5. Broad DELETE for Authenticated Role: direct API bypass: Backend endpoints should mediate deletions.
6. Broad DELETE for Authenticated Role: direct API bypass: Log and audit all delete requests.
7. Broad DELETE for Authenticated Role: direct API bypass: Test unauthorized deletes regularly.
8. Broad DELETE for Authenticated Role: migration drift regression: Migrations can add dangerous grants.

SQL sanity checks for Broad DELETE for Authenticated Role (optional, but high signal)

If you prefer evidence over intuition, run a small set of SQL checks after each fix.

The goal is not to memorize catalog tables — it’s to make sure the access boundary you intended is the one Postgres actually enforces:

• Confirm RLS is enabled (and forced where appropriate) for tables tied to this term.
• List policies and read them as plain language: who can do what, under what condition?
• Audit grants for anon/authenticated and PUBLIC on the tables, views, and functions involved.
• If Storage is involved: review bucket privacy and policies for listing/reads.
• If RPC is involved: review EXECUTE grants for functions and whether privileged functions are server-only.

Pair these checks with a direct API access test using client credentials. When both agree, you can ship the fix with confidence.

Over time, keep a small “query pack” for the checks you trust and run it after every migration. That’s how you prevent quiet regressions.

Prevent Broad DELETE for Authenticated Role drift (so it doesn’t come back)

• Add a repeatable checklist and re-run it after schema changes.
• Prefer backend-only access for sensitive resources.
• Keep one reusable verification test for “Broad DELETE for Authenticated Role: direct API bypass” and rerun it after every migration that touches this surface.
• Keep one reusable verification test for “Broad DELETE for Authenticated Role: migration drift regression” and rerun it after every migration that touches this surface.

Rollout plan for Broad DELETE for Authenticated Role fixes (without breaking production)

Many hardening changes fail because teams revoke direct access first and only later discover missing backend paths.

Use this sequence to reduce both risk and outage pressure:

1. Implement and verify the backend endpoint or server action before permission changes.
2. Switch clients to that backend path behind a feature flag when possible.
3. Then revoke direct client access (broad grants, permissive policies, public bucket reads, or broad EXECUTE).
4. Run direct-access denial tests and confirm authorized backend flows still succeed.
5. Re-scan after deployment and again after the next migration.

This turns security fixes into repeatable rollout mechanics instead of one-off emergency changes.

Incident breakdowns for Broad DELETE for Authenticated Role (real scenarios)

Broad DELETE for Authenticated Role: direct API bypass

Scenario: The frontend granted DELETE permissions to authenticated so users could remove their own posts.

What failed: No ownership checks meant attackers could issue direct REST calls and delete arbitrary rows.

What fixed it: Revoke the grant, route deletes through a backend endpoint with validation, and enforce RLS or policies.

Why the fix worked: Backend code now checks ownership and logs every deletion before it hits the DB.

Key takeaways:

• DELETE is a sensitive operation.
• Backend endpoints should mediate deletions.
• Log and audit all delete requests.
• Test unauthorized deletes regularly.

Read full example: Broad DELETE for Authenticated Role: direct API bypass

Broad DELETE for Authenticated Role: migration drift regression

Scenario: A new feature adds a table and grants DELETE to authenticated without restriction.

What failed: The grant let any logged-in user delete rows across tenants.

What fixed it: Add restrictive policies, backend-only delete flows, and include grant validation in migration reviews.

Why the fix worked: Explicit protections prevent unauthorized deletes and CI checks stop future regressions.

Key takeaways:

• Migrations can add dangerous grants.
• CI should validate delete permissions.
• Document who is allowed to delete each table.
• Test unauthorized deletes after schema changes.

Read full example: Broad DELETE for Authenticated Role: migration drift regression

Real-world examples of Broad DELETE for Authenticated Role (and why they work)

• Broad DELETE for Authenticated Role: direct API bypass — Authenticated DELETE allowed attackers to remove other users’ rows.
• Broad DELETE for Authenticated Role: migration drift regression — A migration introduced a broad authenticated DELETE grant, reopening exposure.

Related terms

• Broad UPDATE for Authenticated Role → /glossary/broad-authenticated-update
• Default Privilege Drift → /glossary/default-privilege-drift