Technical Co-founder

Pain points for a Technical Co-founder

• You juggle product, hiring, and engineering, so security gets interrupted often
• High-impact risks are easy to miss without a structured checklist
• Security decisions must be understandable to non-security teammates
• You need to reduce risk quickly before fundraising or enterprise pilots
• You need controls that scale from MVP to early growth

Goals for a Technical Co-founder

• Prioritize highest-severity exposure fixes first
• Adopt clear backend-only boundaries for sensitive paths
• Build a repeatable security review rhythm after releases
• Turn scan findings into actionable remediation tasks

What Technical Co-founders should prioritize first (highest leverage)

1. Block direct client access to the most sensitive surface you have today (tables, Storage, or RPC).
2. Make verification easy: you should be able to prove the fix with one direct access test.
3. Reduce complexity before adding more rules: backend-only access beats a large pile of fragile policies.
4. Add one small regression guard (checklist query, scan, or release checklist item).

Recommended templates (fastest safe wins)

• Lock down a public table (backend-only access) → /templates/access-control/lock-down-public-table — A template to revoke direct client access, enable RLS, remove policies, and force all reads/writes through your backend using service_role.
• Make a bucket private + serve files with signed URLs → /templates/storage-safety/make-bucket-private-signed-urls — A template to make Supabase Storage buckets private, prevent listing/enumeration, and deliver downloads using short-lived signed URLs from your backend.
• Lock down RPC: revoke EXECUTE from public roles → /templates/rpc-functions/lock-down-rpc-execute — A template to discover function signatures, revoke EXECUTE from PUBLIC/anon/authenticated, and call RPC only through backend code using service_role.
• Remove over-permissive RLS policies (adopt deny-by-default) → /templates/access-control/remove-over-permissive-policies — A template to remove broad policies that leak data and move to a backend-only, deny-by-default posture that is easier to reason about and verify.

Recommended glossary terms (learn the why)

• Row Level Security (RLS) → /glossary/row-level-security — Row Level Security (RLS) is the row-by-row gatekeeper that blocks anon/authenticated clients from touching rows they do not own, but it only protects data when it is enabled and forced.
• Public Table Exposure → /glossary/public-table-exposure — Public table exposure happens when tables accept anon/authenticated requests without row filters or backend gating, making them effectively open.
• Over-permissive RLS Policies → /glossary/over-permissive-rls-policies — Over-permissive RLS policies let too many rows through or cover too many actions, defeating the point of row security.
• Supabase Storage Bucket Privacy → /glossary/supabase-storage-bucket-privacy — Storage bucket privacy means restricting downloads and listings so only authorized backend code can fetch objects.
• RPC EXECUTE Grants → /glossary/rpc-execute-grants — RPC execute grants control which roles can call Postgres functions, and long-lived PUBLIC/anon grants often outlive their intended use.
• Signed URLs → /glossary/signed-urls — Signed URLs give temporary, scoped access to private storage objects, but poor signing still leaks data.
• Service Role Key → /glossary/service-role-key — The service role key must live on the server; leaking it to the browser hands attackers full database control.
• Forced RLS (FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY) → /glossary/force-row-level-security — Forcing RLS guarantees ownership filters cannot be bypassed by privileged sessions.
• Client Role Grants (anon/authenticated) → /glossary/client-role-grants — Client role grants (anon/authenticated) create an API surface, and misusing them exposes data to any client.
• Ownership-bound RLS Policies → /glossary/ownership-bound-rls-policies — Ownership-bound policies tie rows to a user or tenant; missing that link leaves data open.
• Storage Object Enumeration → /glossary/storage-object-enumeration — Object enumeration happens when buckets allow listing or predictable keys, giving attackers a catalog of files.
• Public RPC Surface Area → /glossary/public-rpc-surface-area — Public RPC surface area is every function you leave EXECUTE access to client roles, and it tends to grow into a leak.
• NEXT_PUBLIC Secret Leakage → /glossary/next-public-secret-leakage — Any secret placed in a NEXT_PUBLIC variable becomes public, so these env vars can never hold sensitive keys.
• Broken Object Level Authorization (BOLA) → /glossary/broken-object-level-authorization — Broken Object Level Authorization happens when each object is not validated against the requester, letting attackers read other users’ data.
• Insecure Direct Object References (IDOR) → /glossary/insecure-direct-object-references — Insecure Direct Object References happen when object IDs are exposed without authorization checks.
• Tenant ID Trusted from Client → /glossary/tenant-id-trust-in-client — Trusting tenant IDs from the client lets attackers impersonate other tenants.
• Missing WITH CHECK Policy → /glossary/missing-with-check-policy — Missing WITH CHECK clauses expose write paths even when reads are locked down.
• Broad SELECT for Authenticated Role → /glossary/broad-authenticated-select — Broad authenticated SELECT grants let every logged-in user read sensitive tables.
• Broad UPDATE for Authenticated Role → /glossary/broad-authenticated-update — Broad authenticated UPDATE grants let every logged-in user change other people’s rows.
• Broad DELETE for Authenticated Role → /glossary/broad-authenticated-delete — Broad authenticated DELETE grants allow any logged-in user to remove rows.
• Default Privilege Drift → /glossary/default-privilege-drift — Default privilege drift happens when inherited grants become permissive, exposing every new object you create.
• Schema USAGE Granted to PUBLIC → /glossary/schema-usage-granted-to-public — Granting USAGE on a schema to PUBLIC exposes everything inside it.
• Exposed Materialized Views → /glossary/exposed-materialized-views — Exposed materialized views are cached results that leak data the moment you grant clients access.
• Insecure SECURITY DEFINER Functions → /glossary/insecure-security-definer-functions — Insecure SECURITY DEFINER Functions is a Supabase security risk where privileged functions execute with elevated rights but lack strict guardrails, .
• Mutable Function search_path → /glossary/mutable-function-search-path — Mutable Function search_path is a Supabase security risk where function execution can be hijacked when search_path is not pinned safely, .
• Trigger Privilege Escalation → /glossary/trigger-privilege-escalation — Trigger Privilege Escalation is a Supabase security risk where trigger functions perform privileged operations without clear authorization boundaries, .
• Migration Owner Bypass of RLS → /glossary/migration-owner-bypass — Migration Owner Bypass of RLS is a Supabase security risk where owner-level migration scripts bypass policy assumptions and access controls, .
• Shadow Table Without RLS → /glossary/shadow-table-without-rls — Shadow Table Without RLS is a Supabase security risk where new helper tables ship without RLS and silently expose internal data, .
• Audit Log Table Publicly Readable → /glossary/audit-log-public-readable — Audit Log Table Publicly Readable is a Supabase security risk where diagnostic or audit tables become queryable by client roles, .
• Soft Delete Policy Bypass → /glossary/soft-delete-policy-bypass — Soft Delete Policy Bypass is a Supabase security risk where deleted rows remain accessible because policies do not enforce deleted-state filtering, .
• UPSERT Policy Gap → /glossary/upsert-policy-gap — UPSERT Policy Gap is a Supabase security risk where upsert paths bypass intended checks when insert and update logic diverge, .
• Cross-Schema Data Exposure → /glossary/cross-schema-exposure — Cross-Schema Data Exposure is a Supabase security risk where objects in unintended schemas become reachable through grants or API exposure settings, .
• Unrestricted View Definitions → /glossary/unrestricted-view-definitions — Unrestricted View Definitions is a Supabase security risk where views reveal sensitive joins and fields without sufficient access filtering, .
• Leaked JWT Signing Secret → /glossary/leaked-jwt-secret — Leaked JWT Signing Secret is a Supabase security risk where token-signing secrets leak and allow forged authentication tokens, .
• Stale JWT Claims → /glossary/stale-jwt-claims — Stale JWT Claims is a Supabase security risk where authorization decisions rely on outdated claims that no longer match server state, .
• Auth Role Claim Confusion → /glossary/auth-role-claim-confusion — Auth Role Claim Confusion is a Supabase security risk where role mapping is ambiguous and grants unintended privileges to users, .
• Magic Link Open Redirect → /glossary/magic-link-redirect-open-redirect — Magic Link Open Redirect is a Supabase security risk where authentication links redirect users to attacker-controlled destinations, .
• Password Reset Token Leakage → /glossary/password-reset-token-leakage — Password Reset Token Leakage is a Supabase security risk where reset tokens leak through logs, URLs, or client-side handling, .
• OAuth Role Mapping Errors → /glossary/oauth-role-mapping-errors — OAuth Role Mapping Errors is a Supabase security risk where external identity attributes are mapped to internal roles without strict checks, .
• SSO Group Sync Escalation → /glossary/sso-group-sync-escalation — SSO Group Sync Escalation is a Supabase security risk where group sync grants elevated access when role sync rules are too permissive, .
• Invite Flow Tenant Escalation → /glossary/invite-flow-tenant-escalation — Invite Flow Tenant Escalation is a Supabase security risk where invitation flows allow membership changes beyond intended tenant scope, .
• Membership Race Condition → /glossary/membership-race-condition — Membership Race Condition is a Supabase security risk where concurrent membership updates create temporary unauthorized access windows, .
• Admin Panel Client-Only Auth → /glossary/admin-panel-client-auth-only — Admin Panel Client-Only Auth is a Supabase security risk where admin protections live in frontend checks instead of enforceable backend authorization, .
• Database URL Leaked in Client → /glossary/leaked-database-url-in-client — Database URL Leaked in Client is a Supabase security risk where database connection details leak into browser bundles and deployment artifacts, .
• Secrets in Repository History → /glossary/secrets-in-repo-history — Secrets in Repository History is a Supabase security risk where historical commits expose credentials long after they were removed from current code, .
• Environment Parity Security Drift → /glossary/env-parity-security-drift — Environment Parity Security Drift is a Supabase security risk where security controls differ across dev, staging, and production environments, .
• Staging Database Public Exposure → /glossary/staging-db-public-exposure — Staging Database Public Exposure is a Supabase security risk where staging deployments expose production-like data with weak controls, .
• Test Data Left in Production → /glossary/test-data-in-production — Test Data Left in Production is a Supabase security risk where non-production data handling introduces privacy and integrity risks, .
• Unencrypted Sensitive Columns → /glossary/unencrypted-sensitive-columns — Unencrypted Sensitive Columns is a Supabase security risk where high-risk fields are stored without column-level encryption or tokenization strategy, .
• Missing Key Rotation Policy → /glossary/key-rotation-policy-missing — Missing Key Rotation Policy is a Supabase security risk where long-lived secrets persist without rotation, increasing blast radius during incidents, .
• Service Role Overreach in Cron Jobs → /glossary/service-role-overreach-in-cron — Service Role Overreach in Cron Jobs is a Supabase security risk where scheduled jobs run with excessive privileges for routine operations, .
• PII in Error Traces → /glossary/pii-in-error-traces — PII in Error Traces is a Supabase security risk where stack traces and error payloads leak personal data across observability systems, .
• PII in Analytics Events → /glossary/pii-in-analytics-events — PII in Analytics Events is a Supabase security risk where tracking events include sensitive fields not needed for product analytics, .
• Missing Data Retention Policy → /glossary/data-retention-policy-missing — Missing Data Retention Policy is a Supabase security risk where sensitive data is kept indefinitely without lifecycle controls, .
• Incomplete GDPR Delete Flow → /glossary/incomplete-gdpr-delete-flow — Incomplete GDPR Delete Flow is a Supabase security risk where delete flows remove top-level records but leave recoverable personal data behind, .
• No Exfiltration Anomaly Detection → /glossary/no-anomaly-detection-exfiltration — No Exfiltration Anomaly Detection is a Supabase security risk where large abnormal data reads go unnoticed without baseline monitoring and alerting, .
• Weak Tenant Isolation Tests → /glossary/weak-tenant-isolation-tests — Weak Tenant Isolation Tests is a Supabase security risk where automated tests fail to prove cross-tenant access is consistently blocked, .
• Policy Drift After Schema Rename → /glossary/policy-drift-after-schema-rename — Policy Drift After Schema Rename is a Supabase security risk where renamed tables and columns silently desynchronize policy behavior, .
• Orphaned Policies After Table Rename → /glossary/orphaned-policies-after-table-rename — Orphaned Policies After Table Rename is a Supabase security risk where legacy policies remain detached from intended objects after refactors, .
• Generated Columns Leak Sensitive Data → /glossary/generated-columns-sensitive-leak — Generated Columns Leak Sensitive Data is a Supabase security risk where derived columns unintentionally expose sensitive source attributes, .
• View Without Security Barrier → /glossary/view-without-security-barrier — View Without Security Barrier is a Supabase security risk where view planning behavior can leak data when security barriers are not applied, .
• Missing Column-Level Redaction → /glossary/column-level-redaction-missing — Missing Column-Level Redaction is a Supabase security risk where applications expose full records when only partial fields should be visible, .
• Unrestricted PostgREST Origin Proxy → /glossary/unrestricted-postgrest-origin — Unrestricted PostgREST Origin Proxy is a Supabase security risk where proxy layers forward API requests without validating trusted origins, .
• CORS Misconfiguration in Edge Functions → /glossary/cors-misconfiguration-edge-functions — CORS Misconfiguration in Edge Functions is a Supabase security risk where permissive CORS allows untrusted origins to trigger privileged flows, .
• Missing Webhook Signature Validation → /glossary/missing-webhook-signature-validation — Missing Webhook Signature Validation is a Supabase security risk where incoming webhooks are trusted without cryptographic authenticity checks, .
• Webhook Replay Attack Risk → /glossary/webhook-replay-attack-risk — Webhook Replay Attack Risk is a Supabase security risk where valid webhook messages can be replayed to repeat sensitive actions, .
• Billing Webhook Idempotency Gap → /glossary/billing-webhook-idempotency-gap — Billing Webhook Idempotency Gap is a Supabase security risk where billing events are processed multiple times and create inconsistent account states, .
• Insecure Edge Function Authentication → /glossary/insecure-edge-function-auth — Insecure Edge Function Authentication is a Supabase security risk where edge endpoints process privileged actions before enforcing robust auth checks, .
• Edge Function Service Role Overuse → /glossary/edge-function-service-role-overuse — Edge Function Service Role Overuse is a Supabase security risk where service role credentials are used in functions that only need limited permissions, .
• RPC Dynamic SQL Injection → /glossary/rpc-dynamic-sql-injection — RPC Dynamic SQL Injection is a Supabase security risk where function logic builds SQL dynamically from untrusted parameters, .
• RPC Missing Input Validation → /glossary/rpc-missing-input-validation — RPC Missing Input Validation is a Supabase security risk where RPC handlers accept malformed or dangerous inputs without strict validation, .
• RPC Unbounded Result Sets → /glossary/rpc-unbounded-result-set — RPC Unbounded Result Sets is a Supabase security risk where RPC functions return excessive rows and enable low-cost data scraping, .
• RPC Error Message Data Leak → /glossary/rpc-error-data-leak — RPC Error Message Data Leak is a Supabase security risk where error paths disclose stack details, SQL fragments, or sensitive identifiers, .
• Public Function Source Disclosure → /glossary/public-function-source-disclosure — Public Function Source Disclosure is a Supabase security risk where function definitions leak business logic and internal assumptions to low-privilege roles, .
• Overloaded RPC Signature Miss → /glossary/overloaded-rpc-signature-miss — Overloaded RPC Signature Miss is a Supabase security risk where security reviews miss overloaded signatures that remain callable with weaker controls, .
• Unrestricted Admin Search Endpoint → /glossary/unrestricted-admin-search-endpoint — Unrestricted Admin Search Endpoint is a Supabase security risk where search endpoints provide broad access to internal records and metadata, .
• Bulk Export Endpoint Overexposure → /glossary/bulk-export-endpoint-overexposure — Bulk Export Endpoint Overexposure is a Supabase security risk where export APIs allow high-volume extraction without strong authorization and limits, .
• CSV Import Trusts Client Columns → /glossary/csv-import-trusts-client-columns — CSV Import Trusts Client Columns is a Supabase security risk where import flows allow users to overwrite sensitive fields through crafted headers, .
• Row Ownership Transfer Without Recheck → /glossary/row-ownership-transfer-without-recheck — Row Ownership Transfer Without Recheck is a Supabase security risk where ownership updates are accepted without validating transfer authority, .
• File Upload MIME Spoofing → /glossary/file-upload-mime-spoofing — File Upload MIME Spoofing is a Supabase security risk where uploaded files bypass validation by spoofing content type metadata, .
• Storage Upload Size Abuse → /glossary/storage-upload-size-abuse — Storage Upload Size Abuse is a Supabase security risk where uploads lack size limits and create denial-of-wallet and abuse risks, .
• Missing Malware Scanning on Uploads → /glossary/missing-malware-scanning-uploads — Missing Malware Scanning on Uploads is a Supabase security risk where user-uploaded files are served without malware scanning or quarantine workflows, .
• Public Backup Bucket Leak → /glossary/public-backup-bucket-leak — Public Backup Bucket Leak is a Supabase security risk where backup artifacts become publicly readable through misconfigured storage buckets, .
• Expired Signed URL Caching Leak → /glossary/expired-signed-url-caching-leak — Expired Signed URL Caching Leak is a Supabase security risk where cached responses keep files accessible after signed URL expiry windows, .
• Object Path Predictability Risk → /glossary/object-path-predictability-risk — Object Path Predictability Risk is a Supabase security risk where predictable object paths make private assets easy to enumerate and scrape, .
• Storage Lifecycle Policy Missing → /glossary/storage-lifecycle-policy-missing — Storage Lifecycle Policy Missing is a Supabase security risk where old objects remain accessible because storage lifecycle and cleanup policies are absent, .
• Bucket LIST Permission Too Broad → /glossary/bucket-list-permission-too-broad — Bucket LIST Permission Too Broad is a Supabase security risk where list permissions expose object inventories that assist targeted abuse, .
• Realtime Channel Authorization Gap → /glossary/realtime-channel-authorization-gap — Realtime Channel Authorization Gap is a Supabase security risk where channel subscriptions are accepted without enforcing tenant-aware authorization rules, .
• Realtime Presence Data Leak → /glossary/realtime-presence-data-leak — Realtime Presence Data Leak is a Supabase security risk where presence metadata reveals user behavior and identifiers to unauthorized clients, .
• Publication Includes Sensitive Tables → /glossary/publication-includes-sensitive-tables — Publication Includes Sensitive Tables is a Supabase security risk where logical replication publishes sensitive tables that should never stream to clients, .
• Replication Role Overgrant → /glossary/replication-role-overgrant — Replication Role Overgrant is a Supabase security risk where replication roles receive privileges beyond strict replication requirements, .
• Unbounded Pagination Enumeration → /glossary/unbounded-pagination-enumeration — Unbounded Pagination Enumeration is a Supabase security risk where pagination controls are weak and allow low-cost full dataset traversal, .
• Guessable Primary Keys → /glossary/guessable-primary-keys — Guessable Primary Keys is a Supabase security risk where sequential or predictable identifiers simplify unauthorized record discovery, .
• Missing Rate Limits on Write Paths → /glossary/rate-limit-missing-on-write-paths — Missing Rate Limits on Write Paths is a Supabase security risk where write endpoints can be abused for spam, brute force, and denial-of-wallet, .
• Missing CAPTCHA on Sensitive Flows → /glossary/missing-captcha-sensitive-flows — Missing CAPTCHA on Sensitive Flows is a Supabase security risk where high-risk workflows lack anti-automation controls against scripted abuse, .
• Insecure Feature Flag Disclosure → /glossary/insecure-feature-flag-disclosure — Insecure Feature Flag Disclosure is a Supabase security risk where flag payloads expose hidden capabilities and internal rollout logic, .
• No Two-Person Review for Privilege Changes → /glossary/no-two-person-review-privilege-changes — No Two-Person Review for Privilege Changes is a Supabase security risk where single-actor privilege changes increase risk of accidental or malicious escalation, .
• Dependency Drift Misses Security Updates → /glossary/dependency-drift-security-updates-missed — Dependency Drift Misses Security Updates is a Supabase security risk where stale dependencies keep known vulnerabilities in critical runtime paths, .
• Private Key Material in Logs → /glossary/private-key-material-in-logs — Private Key Material in Logs is a Supabase security risk where sensitive key material is accidentally emitted to application and infrastructure logs, .
• API Cache Leaks Private Data → /glossary/api-cache-private-data-leak — API Cache Leaks Private Data is a Supabase security risk where shared caches return user-specific responses to unauthorized sessions, .
• Data API Public Schema Exposure → /glossary/data-api-public-schema-exposure — Data API Public Schema Exposure occurs when sensitive tables remain in exposed schemas, making direct REST or GraphQL access possible with client-side credentials.
• Data API Custom Schema Misconfiguration → /glossary/data-api-custom-schema-misconfiguration — Data API Custom Schema Misconfiguration happens when teams move to a custom exposed schema but leave permissive grants, search paths, or legacy objects that keep data reachable.
• pg_graphql Extension Exposure → /glossary/pg-graphql-extension-exposure — pg_graphql Extension Exposure appears when GraphQL remains enabled on schemas or objects that should not be reachable from client credentials.
• Realtime Public Channel Mode → /glossary/realtime-public-channel-mode — Realtime Public Channel Mode is the risk of allowing broad channel subscription without private-channel authorization rules and topic scoping.
• Realtime Topic Policy Mismatch → /glossary/realtime-topic-policy-mismatch — Realtime Topic Policy Mismatch occurs when channel topic patterns and RLS authorization logic diverge, allowing unintended subscribers or publishers.
• Realtime Broadcast Overexposure → /glossary/realtime-broadcast-overexposure — Realtime Broadcast Overexposure is the accidental publication of sensitive payloads to channels where recipients are broader than intended.
• Edge Function JWT Verification Gap → /glossary/edge-function-jwt-verification-gap — Edge Function JWT Verification Gap occurs when function handlers skip or misapply token validation, allowing unauthorized execution paths.
• Service Role Authorization Header Override → /glossary/service-role-authorization-header-override — Service Role Authorization Header Override is when a client initialized for admin use silently runs with user session headers, changing expected privilege behavior.
• Publishable vs Secret Key Scope Confusion → /glossary/publishable-secret-key-scope-confusion — Publishable vs Secret Key Scope Confusion is the misuse of key types across client and server boundaries, resulting in over-privileged execution paths.
• Missing Network Restrictions → /glossary/missing-network-restrictions — Missing Network Restrictions means database and pooler endpoints are reachable from unrestricted IP ranges, increasing brute-force and credential abuse risk.
• IPv6 Allowlist Gap → /glossary/ipv6-allowlist-gap — IPv6 Allowlist Gap is the mistaken assumption that IPv4 restrictions are enough, leaving IPv6 connection routes less constrained than intended.
• Default Function EXECUTE to PUBLIC → /glossary/default-function-execute-to-public — Default Function EXECUTE to PUBLIC is the risk that newly created routines remain callable by broad roles unless explicit revokes/default privileges are applied.
• Untrusted Language Function Risk → /glossary/untrusted-language-function-risk — Untrusted Language Function Risk is the danger of running routines with capabilities that can circumvent normal access boundaries if creation/execution controls are weak.
• Storage Authenticated Endpoint Overtrust → /glossary/storage-authenticated-endpoint-overtrust — Storage Authenticated Endpoint Overtrust is relying on logged-in status alone for private file access without strict path ownership and bucket policy checks.

A safe default architecture for Technical Co-founders

If you’re not sure which model to choose, this default posture prevents many Supabase leaks:

• The browser is untrusted and uses only anon/auth tokens for public, non-sensitive actions.
• All sensitive reads/writes go through backend endpoints (server actions or API routes).
• Service-role secrets never leave the server environment.
• RLS is used as a safety gate, not the only authorization mechanism.

You can always relax this posture later if you intentionally want client-side access — but tightening after a leak is harder.

A simple weekly security rhythm

1. Scan or run checklist queries after schema changes.
2. Fix one high-risk exposure (tables, storage, RPC).
3. Verify via direct client access tests.
4. Document the decision and add a regression check.

Verification loop for a Technical Co-founder (what “done” looks like)

• You can reproduce the risky behavior before the fix (so you’re not guessing).
• After the fix, the same direct access attempt fails with a clear denial.
• The app still works through backend endpoints for authorized users.
• A scan/checklist re-run confirms the exposure signal is gone.
• You wrote down the rule so the next schema change doesn’t reintroduce it.

Common traps (what to avoid)

• Shipping quick policy changes without verification.
• Leaving Storage public because it’s “only files”.
• Keeping RPC callable because it’s “just internal”.
• Putting service_role in client env vars.

What to automate next (as Technical Co-founders mature)

• A drift check after migrations: new tables with RLS disabled, new public EXECUTE grants, new public buckets.
• A lightweight “security change” checklist in PRs: policies, grants, buckets, functions, auth flows.
• Monitoring for unusual reads/writes, especially anonymous access to sensitive surfaces.

A one-day hardening plan for a Technical Co-founder

1. Pick one surface (tables, Storage, or RPC) and inventory the resources you consider sensitive.
2. Apply one template/conversion end-to-end and keep the change small.
3. Run verification (direct access fails) and fix any missed app call paths.
4. Document the access model and add a drift guard for the next migration.
5. Repeat for the next surface next week instead of trying to do everything at once.

What to monitor as a Technical Co-founder

• Unexpected anonymous reads/writes or Storage downloads.
• Denied access spikes after tightening permissions (often indicates missed app paths).
• Changes to policies/grants/buckets/functions that didn’t go through review.

Common scenarios for a Technical Co-founder (and the safest response)

• A new table ships and the UI needs data quickly → add a backend endpoint first, then decide if client access is truly necessary.
• A file download feature ships fast → keep buckets private and use signed URLs from the server, even if it feels slower at first.
• A new function is added for convenience → treat RPC as privileged by default and revoke public EXECUTE unless reviewed.
• A migration changes policies/grants → re-run verification checks immediately to catch drift before users do.

A “boundary statement” template for Technical Co-founders

A boundary statement is a one-sentence rule you can put in docs and PRs so security is reviewable and testable.

Use this template and fill it in:

• Only the backend can (operation) on (resource) because (reason).
• The browser can only (safe operation) and must never call (privileged path) directly.
• Verification: the direct access test (describe it) must fail in dev/staging/prod.

Writing this down turns security into a repeatable habit and makes regressions obvious.